The attempted self-coup in Peru in the year 2022

This record explains the attempted self-coup in Peru in the year 2022, by then-president Pedro Castillo. Selected this subject as starting topic because results quite easy to explain and hence serves for testing the first format of this blog, and because sets some background about the situation of the region I inhabit; then the records of the next days will focus on the russian invasion of Ukraine.

The peruvian laws

The Peruvian Constitution includes a concept called «matter of confidence». The nature of a «matter of confidence» does not stand recorded in the constitution, but stands recorded a way to raise such event on the peruvian congress (parliament), and the constitution defines consequences for the «refusal» of such request. About this, result fundamental articles 133 and 134 of the Peruvian Constitution, and the law 31355.

Thus, cite of the Peruvian Constitution, translated, clarifications in square brackets added by me:

Article 133.- The president of the Council of Ministers [executive branch] can raise before the Congress a matter of confidence on the name of the Council. If the matter gets rejected upon him, or if he gets censored, or if he renounces [from office], or if the President of the Republic replaces him, [then] happens the total crisis of the cabinet.

Article 134.- The president of the Republic holds a faculty to dissolve the Congress if this [legislative body] censored or denied its confidence to two Councils of Ministers. The decree of dissolution contains the convocation for elections for a new Congress. Such elections get performed during the next four months of the dissolution date, without the possibility of modifying the preexisting electoral system.

The Congress cannot get dissolved during the last year of its tenure. [Once] dissolved the Congress, the Permanent Commission [of the same Congress] continues operating, this latter cannot get dissolved.

Do not exist other ways of revoking the parliamentary mandate.

Under state of siege, the Congress cannot get dissolved.

The concept «total crisis of the cabinet» likewise does not stand defined in the constitution, nor any consequence of such event. However, the first paragraph of Article 134 implies that the Council of Ministers which presents a second «matter of confidence» must result other than the one which presented the first.

Law 31355 results also simple; as before, I cite the peruvian law 31355, translated, clarifications in square brackets added by me:

Only Article.

The faculty of a minister and of the president of the Council of Ministers on the name of the Council, to present a matter of confidence according to the last paragraph of article 132 and article 133 of the Political Constitution of Peru, refers to matters of [or within the] competence of the Executive Power directly related to the realization of his general policy of government, not standing, among those, those related to the approval or not of constitutional reforms nor those which affect the procedures and competences exclusive and exclusory [from others] of the Congress of the Republic or of other constitutionally autonomous organisms.

There exists no ambiguity about the matters upon which can get applied the «matter of confidence».

The facts

  1. On February 3, 2022, the Constitutional Tribunal of Peru (of the judicial branch of the state), rejected a request presented by the executive branch to declare unconstitutional the law 31355. Thus, law 31355 remained valid.
  2. On November 8, 2022, the President of the Council of Ministers (of the executive branch of the state) presented upon the congress a «matter of confidence» against the law 31355; notwithstanding that the same law precluded the possibility of doing such request involving legislative affairs.
  3. On November 17, 2022, the same President of the same Council of Ministers presented upon the congress another «matter of confidence» against another law. Again disregarding law 31355.

  4. On December 7, 2022, the president of the republic of Peru, pretending that the congress rejected two «matters of confidence», announced the dissolution of the congress, but did so on terms different from those prescribed by article 134. Accordingly, the president of the republic says:

    The following measures get dictated: To temporarily dissolve the Congress of the Republic and to install an exceptional-emergency government. To convoke, on the shortest term, for elections for a new Congress with constituent faculties in order to elaborate a new constitution within a period no longer than 9 months.

    And then, as none of his legal faculties allowed for the following, the president of the republic of Peru brazenly added; clarification in square brackets inserted by me:

    The system of justice gets declared in reorganization: Judicial Power, Public Ministry [of the judicial branch], National Board of Justice, and the Constitutional Tribunal.

The outcome

The Congress of Peru discharged the coup leader from the office of President of the Republic of that country, and the coup leader got thrown in jail. The Congress applied Article 113 of the Constitution of Peru, which starts as:

Article 113.- The Presidency of the Republic becomes empty by:

  1. Death of the President of the Republic.
  2. His permanent physical or moral incapacity, declared by Congress.
  3. . . .

Final observations and conclusions

  1. Some defenders of the coup leader assert that «right-wing actors smeared and hindered the project of then-president Pedro Castillo by means of a campaign of lies, and the man merely defended himself and his project». Yet lies get countered and neutralized by saying and publicizing the truth, not by attempting a state coup.
  2. The peruvian democracy results still fragile: The poor redaction of the Peruvian Constitution reflects underdeveloped organizational skills. Law 31355 precisely patches one of the glaring defects of the Peruvian Constitution, since Article 134 would grant the executive branch of the state—
    • The power to legislate by means of a factual veto power of any uncomfortable laws, and
    • The ability to interrupt the work of the Congress at will by merely presenting unacceptable requests whose rejection allow him to dissolve it.
  3. In a representative democracy configured according to the prevalent fashion, any attempt to place the executive branch of the state above and beyond the legislative branch denotes a highly authoritarian culture. This happens because the many members of parliament may hold much more numerous and diverse points of view than a single individual which gets elected for the highest-ranking post of the executive branch. The numerous parliament implies more room for the expression of the societal diversity, and thereby the people stand represented more accurately by the members of that political body.

  4. A coup to «fix the Constitution» does not strengthen a fragile yet still-functioning democracy, only strengthens the rule of brute force. In comparison, result more civilized discrete additions like the law 31355.

    Further, if the Constitution really results non-salvageable or dysfunctional, then societal organized actors can propose a reform for everyone to listen to it. Then will result a visible a large majority working to find a civilized way to transition to the next stage.

  5. On the aftermath of the coup attempt, the mexican state intervened for the defence of the enemies of democracy in Peru. Such defence at first consisted mostly in a gross campaign of disinformation by mexican state propagandists, and multiple verbal expressions of support by mexican state functionaries. Yet the defence then evolved into the physical protection of a fugitive associate of the coup leader, hidden nowadays inside the mexican embassy in Lima under the guise of «political asylum».

    Thus, the current foreign policy of the mexican state regarding this subject results a disgrace for the development of democracy in the countries of America. This sort of «political favours» very probably constitute part of an effort to build an alliance of like-minded authoritarian groups in the region.

--
Anders Baerbock
2025.327




References:
[https://gobpe-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/document/file/198518/Constitucion_Politica_del_Peru_1993.pdf]
[https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/dispositivo/NL/2003559-1]
[https://tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2022/00032-2021-AI.pdf]
[https://lpderecho.pe/premier-anibal-torres-presenta-cuestion-confianza-sobre-proyecto-ley-define-alcances-dicha-figura/]
[https://elperuano.pe/noticia/197176-ejecutivo-presenta-cuestion-de-confianza-ante-el-congreso]
[https://youtube.com/watch?v=lfG8PiImmsM]